|
18. Here a most difficult and complex issue
arises which I once dealt with in a large book, in
response to the urgent question whether it is ever
the duty of a righteous man to lie.(34) Some go so
far as to contend that in cases concerning the
worship of God or even the nature of God, it is
sometimes a good and pious deed to speak falsely. It
seems to me, however, that every lie is a sin, albeit
there is a great difference depending on the
intention and the topic of the lie. He does not sin
as much who lies in the attempt to be helpful as the
man who lies as a part of a deliberate wickedness.
Nor does one who, by lying, sets a traveler on the
wrong road do as much harm as one who, by a deceitful
lie, perverts the way of a life. Obviously, no one
should be adjudged a liar who speaks falsely what he
sincerely supposes is the truth, since in his case he
does not deceive but rather is deceived.
Likewise, a
man is not a liar, though he could be charged with
rashness, when he incautiously accepts as true what
is false. On the other hand, however, that man is a
liar in his own conscience who speaks the truth
supposing that it is a falsehood. For as far as his
soul is concerned, since he did not say what he
believed, he did not tell the truth, even though the
truth did come out in what he said. Nor is a man to
be cleared of the charge of lying whose mouth
unknowingly speaks the truth while his conscious
intention is to lie.
If we do not consider the things
spoken of, but only the intentions of the one
speaking, he is the better man who unknowingly speaks
falsely--because he judges his statement to be
true--than the one who unknowingly speaks the truth
while in his heart he is attempting to deceive. For
the first man does not have one intention in his
heart and another in his word, whereas the other,
whatever be the facts in his statement, still "has
one thought locked in his heart, another ready on his
tongue,"(35) which is the very essence of lying.
But
when we do consider the things spoken of, it makes a
great difference in what respect one is deceived or
lies. To be deceived is a lesser evil than to lie, as
far as a man's intentions are concerned. But it is
far more tolerable that a man should lie about things
not connected with religion than for one to be
deceived in matters where faith and knowledge are
prerequisite to the proper service of God.
To
illustrate what I mean by examples: If one man lies
by saying that a dead man is alive, and another man,
being deceived, believes that Christ will die again
after some extended future period--would it not be
incomparably better to lie in the first case than to
be deceived in the second? And would it not be a
lesser evil to lead someone into the former error
than to be led by someone into the latter?
19. In some things, then, we are deceived in great
matters; in others, small. In some of them no harm is
done; in others, even good results. It is a great
evil for a man to be deceived so as not to believe
what would lead him to life eternal, or what would
lead to eternal death. But it is a small evil to be
deceived by crediting a falsehood as the truth in a
matter where one brings on himself some temporal
setback which can then be turned to good use by being
borne in faithful patience--as for example, when
someone judges a man to be good who is actually bad,
and consequently has to suffer evil on his account.
Or, take the man who believes a bad man to be good,
yet suffers no harm at his hand. He is not badly
deceived nor would the prophetic condemnation fall on
him: "Woe to those who call evil good." For we should
understand that this saying refers to the things in
which men are evil and not to the men themselves.
Hence, he who calls adultery a good thing may be
rightly accused by the prophetic word. But if he
calls a man good supposing him to be chaste and not
knowing that he is an adulterer, such a man is not
deceived in his doctrine of good and evil, but only
as to the secrets of human conduct. He calls the man
good on the basis of what he supposed him to be, and
this is undoubtedly a good thing. Moreover, he calls
adultery bad and chastity good. But he calls this
particular man good in ignorance of the fact that he
is an adulterer and not chaste.
In similar fashion,
if one escapes an injury through an error, as I
mentioned before happened to me on that journey,
there is even something good that accrues to a man
through his mistakes. But when I say that in such a
case a man may be deceived without suffering harm therefrom,
or even may gain some benefit thereby, I am not
saying that error is not a bad thing, nor that it is
a positively good thing. I speak only of the evil
which did not happen or the good which did happen,
through the error, which was not caused by the error
itself but which came out of it.
Error, in itself and by itself, whether a great
error in great matters or a small error in small
affairs, is always a bad thing. For who, except in
error, denies that it is bad to approve the false as
though it were the truth, or to disapprove the truth
as though it were falsehood, or to hold what is
certain as if it were uncertain, or what is uncertain
as if it were certain? It is one thing to judge a man
good who is actually bad--this is an error. It is
quite another thing not to suffer harm from something
evil if the wicked man whom we supposed to be good
actually does nothing harmful to us.
It is one thing to suppose that this particular
road is the right one when it is not. It is quite
another thing that, from this error--which is a bad
thing--something good actually turns out, such as
being saved from the onslaught of wicked men. |
|
|
34. |
Ad consentium contra mendacium,
CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol. 41, pp. 469 528; also Migne, PL,
40, c. 517-548; English translation by H.B. Jaffee in
Deferrari, St. Augustine: Treatises on Various Subjects (The
Fathers of the Church, New York, 1952), pp. 113-179. This had
been written about a year earlier than the Enchiridion.
Augustine had also written another treatise On Lying much
earlier, c. 395; see De mendacio in CSEL (J. Zycha, ed.), Vol.
41, pp. 413-466; Migne, PL, 40, c. 487-518; English
translation by M.S. Muldowney in Deferrari, op. cit., pp.
47-109. This summary of his position here represents no change
of view whatever on this question. |
35. |
Sallust, The War with Catiline, X,
6-7. |
|